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Under South Carolina law, in a divorce action the issue of
child custody is "incident and subsidiary to the principal issue
of divorce."' Once a court takes jurisdiction over a divorce and
custody case, that jurisdiction is continuing and exclusive. 2 Modi-
fication of the court's initial custody order may be made upon a
showing of a change in circumstances.3
In Heckle v. Heckle,4 the South Carolina Supreme Court was
faced with two issues: whether the court initially granting the
divorce and awarding custody has exclusive jurisdiction in a sub-
sequent custody proceeding and whether there had been a suffi-
cient change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody of
a child of legally separated parents. By holding that no such
change in circumstances was demonstrated, the court avoided the
question of whether a second court's consideration of the custody
question was precluded by the first court's decision.
Robert C. Heckle instituted an action against Elizabeth B.
Heckle for absolute divorce and for custody of the couple's only
child in the Orangeburg County Court in April 1974.1 Mrs. Heckle
filed a counterclaim for divorce and also sought custody of the
child.' Based on a voluntary agreement of the parties, the county
court issued an order declaring the parties to be legally separated
1. Knopf v. Knopf, 247 S.C. 378, 382, 147 S.E.2d 638, 639 (1966). "Under Section 20-
115, Code of 1962 [S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1976)], an action for divorce brings with
it the issue of child custody and the divorce court has continuing jurisdiction of such issue
as 'incident and subsidiary to the principal issue of divorce.'" Id. at 382, 147 S.E.2d at
639 (citing Jackson v. Jackson, 241 S.C. 1, 13, 126 S.E.2d 855, 862 (1962)).
2. Porter v. Porter, 246 S.C. 332, 143 S.E.2d 619 (1965). Sections 20-3-160 and 20-3-
170 of the 1976 South Carolina Code "expressly vest in the court issuing a divorce decree
the power to modify or vacate its order with reference to the custody of children, and the
granting of alimony and support money, and such jurisdiction is continuing and exclu-
sive." Id. at 345, 143 S.E.2d at 626 (citing Clinkscales v. Clinkscales, 243 S.C. 377, 134
S.E.2d 216 (1963)).
3. "The general rule is that the divorce court may modify or revise its decree or order
as to custody as changed circumstances or conditions may require or justify." Pullen v.
Pullen, 253 S.C. 123, 128, 169 S.E.2d 376, 378 (1969) (quoting 27B C.J.S. Divorce § 317(1)
(1959) (emphasis added by court)); Smith v. Smith, 261 S.C. 81, 198 S.E.2d 271 (1973).
See H. CLARK, THE LAw OF Dommc RELATIONS § 17.7 (1968): "It is usually said that when
a court takes jurisdiction in a custody case, its decree may later be modified on a showing
of changed circumstances." Id. § 17.3 at 583 (footnote omitted).
4. 266 S.C. 355, 223 S.E.2d 590 (1976).
5. Record at 7.
6. 266 S.C. at 357, 223 S.E.2d at 590. Counterclaim is set out in record at 6-10.
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and awarding custody of the child to the mother with visitation
rights to the father.7
Mr. Heckle, on September 17, 1974, then filed a second com-
plaint seeking the same relief on identical grounds in the Family
Court of Orangeburg County.8 Mrs. Heckle sought dismissal of
the action as to child custody on the ground that the county
court's jurisdiction over that issue continued.' The family court
held hearings, and on February 17, 1975, granted a divorce to Mr.
Heckle and awarded him custody of the Heckles' child."' Mrs.
Heckle appealed the custody decision to the South Carolina Su-
preme Court, challenging the family court's authority to deter-
mine custody and contending that there was no change in circum-
stances demonstrated as to warrant a change of custody." The
supreme court accepted Mrs. Heckle's position on the second of
these arguments and reversed the family court's award of custody
to the father.
The primary consideration in determining which parent is to
get custody of a child is the welfare of the child. 3 The majority
opinion in Heckle, written by Chief Justice Lewis, recognized this
rule: "[I]n order to change the custody so fixed by an order of
court, there must be a showing of changed circumstances accru-
ing subsequent to the entry of the decree, which would warrant
modification for the best interests of the child."'
In his complaint, filed with the family court on September
17, 1974, Mr. Heckle alleged that his wife had begun an adulter-
ous relationship with a married man in April 1974, prior to the
county court's order in June 1974, and that the relationship had
continued and existed at the time the complaint was filed in
family court.' 5 The majority said, however, that the husband
failed to allege or prove any change in circumstances subsequent
7. Id. at 357, 223 S.E.2d at 590. For a discussion of the effect of voluntary agreements
on custody decisions, see notes 25, 26 and 28-30 and accompanying text infra.
8. Id. at 357, 223 S.E.2d at 590.
9. Id.
10. Record at 2.
11. Brief for Appellant at 1-11.
12. 266 S.C. at 358-59, 223 S.E.2d at 591-92.
13. Pullen v. Pullen, 253 S.C. 123, 126, 169 S.E.2d 376, 377 (1969); Adams v. Miller,
253 S.C. 118, 121, 169 S.E.2d 391, 392 (1969); Todd v. Todd, 242 S.C. 263, 267, 130 S.E.2d
552, 553 (1963).
14. 266 S.C. at 358, 223 S.E.2d at 591 (citing Pullen v. Pullen, 253 S.C. 123, 169
S.E.2d 376 (1969); Mixson v. Mixson, 253 S.C. 436, 171 S.E.2d 581 (1969)).
15. Record at 3.
[Vol. 29
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to the initial order of the county court which might justify a
change in custody.'" The majority did not consider Mr. Heckle's
allegations of adultery on the part of Mrs. Heckle nor the develop-
ment of certain evidentiary matters since February 20, 1975 (the
date of Mrs. Heckle's notice of intention to appeal) as sufficient
change in circumstances to modify the custody decree and thus
held the family court's decision to be improper."
In dissent, Associate Justice Littlejohn took strong issue with
the majority's view that there had been no change in circumstan-
ces:
At the time of the first order [by the county court], the wife
and husband were still married, with at least some possibility
of reconciliation . . . . she was suspected of adultery but the
same had not been adjudicated.
At the time of the second order [by the family court] . . .
the charge of adultery had been proven, she was divorced and
had been guilty of much misconduct between the time of the
first order and the second.
1 8
Justice Littlejohn also noted that Mrs. Heckle had married her
paramour which, he said, also brings about a change of circum-
stances. 9 These changes, Littlejohn said, warranted a reevalua-
tion of what was in the best interest of the child.
Those cases discussing whether there has been a sufficient
change in circumstances to warrant a change in custody suggest
that the decision is a matter generally left to judicial discretion
after an evaluation of all appropriate factors."0 As a result, it
cannot be said that the majority was incorrect in holding that the
husband failed to show a change in circumstances warranting a
change in custody."
Justice Littlejohn raised a second argument in his dissent,
maintaining that, because custody was initially awarded to the
wife based on an agreement between the parties, the county
court's order did not involve a judicial determination of what was
16. 266 S.C. at 359, 223 S.E.2d at 591-92.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 360, 223 S.E.2d at 592 (footnote omitted).
19. Id. n.1. See Barrett v. Barrett, 261 S.C. 111, 198 S.E.2d 532 (1973); see generally
Annot., 43 A.L.R.2d 363 (1955).
20. See cases at note 3 supra.
21. The burden of proof is on the moving party to show that a change in custody,
initially determined by agreement of the parties, is warranted. See Barrett v. Barrett, 261
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in the child's best interest.22 Although a judicial decree was in-
volved, Littlejohn said, the county court's "summary disposi-
tion" of the custody question was based solely on an agreement
reached between the parties.2 The majority recognized that the
order of the county court was made pursuant to the parties' own
agreement, but conversely considered the order to be "an adjudi-
cation by the court" of what was in the best interest of the child.
24
While the dissent may have been correct in saying that the
county court's disposition of the custody issue did not include a
consideration of what was in the child's best interest, there is a
strong tendency in South Carolina to favor contracts between the
spouses as to the custody of children unless the welfare of the
children requires otherwise.25 Thus, the county court's decision,
incorporating the couple's agreement on custody, has strong sup-
port in past cases.
In Powell v. Powell,26 the supreme court dealt with this issue
in a different setting. Pursuant to a written agreement between
the spouses, custody of one of the children was" awarded to the
father's grandparents. Five years later, in connection with a di-
vorce proceeding, the Greenville County Family Court changed
custody. The supreme court reversed on the grounds that "[tihe
trial court had made no finding of fact that would justify such a
termination of the existing contractual relationship. '2 7 The
Heckle majority followed the Powell court's recognition of the
22. 266 S.C. at 360, 223 S.E.2d at 592.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 358, 223 S.E.2d at 591. For another discussion on the effect of incorporating
a voluntary agreement in a judicial decree, see discussion of Reece v. Reece, infra in this
survey.
25. Powell v. Powell, 256 S.C. 111, 181 S.E.2d 13 (1971); Pullen v. Pullen, 253 S.C.
123, 169 S.E.2d 376 (1969); Ford v. Ford, 242 S.C. 344, 130 S.E.2d 916 (1963). In Pullen,
the court said:
The general law on agreements as to custody of children in post-divorce disputes
is as follows:
"(A] final decree awarding the custody of a child in a divorce case, based
on an agreement of the parties, is conclusive as between them if no change of
circumstances affecting the welfare of the child is shown . .. ."
253 S.C. at 127, 169 S.E.2d at 378 (citing 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 825
(1966)).
26. 256 S.C. 111, 181 S.E.2d 13 (1971).
27. Id. at 115, 181 S.E.2d at 15. The original custody arrangement having been
established by agreement, the Powell court reversed the family court's change in custody,
finding that the court had "assigned no reason for its action, other than the statement
that after having investigated the home of the paternal grandparents it was for the best
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validity of such written agreements by the spouses when it upheld
the county court's approval of the Heckles' voluntary agree-
ment-.2  Thus, while the courts do have authority to change an
award of custody based on a voluntary agreement upon a showing
that such a change is in the child's best interest, the Heckle
majority's view is consistent with the judicial presumption favor-
ing voluntary agreements.?
Under South Carolina law, courts of common pleas, 3 county
courts, 3' and family courts3 2 are all authorized to hear cases in-
volving divorce and custody of children. In Heckle, both the Or-
angeburg County Court, which approved the initial separation
agreement and custody award, and the Family Court of Orange-
burg County, which later granted a divorce to the husband and
awarded custody to the father had statutory power to consider the
custody question. South Carolina follows the general rule,33 how-
ever, that the court which first takes jurisdiction over an action
for divorce and/or custody will not be ousted of that jurisdiction
by subsequent events,34 although some jurisdictions have allowed
a second court to take jurisdiction where habeas corpus proceed-
28. See H. CLARK, supra note 3, at § 17.7: "[Tlhis power which a court has to modify
custody decrees is not diminished by the fact that the original decree was based upon, or
incorporated, an agreement between the spouses relating to custody." (footnote omitted).
See generally Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 1444 (1960).
29. H. CLARK, supra note 3, at § 17.7: "Although the ultimate authority over custody
lies with the courts, they respect parental agreements where consistent with the child's
welfare."
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-50 (1976) provides: "Actions for divorce from the bonds of
matrimony shall, except as otherwise provided, be only in the equity jurisdiction of the
court of common pleas."
31. S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-9-120 (1976) provides: "Any such county court shall have
jurisdiction. . . to try and determine all civil cases. . . both at law and in equity, when
the value of the property in controversy or the amount claimed does not exceed one
thousand dollars . . . ." No. 114, § 3, [1925] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 161 as amended by
No. 195, § 1, [1955] S.C. Acts & Jt. Res. 276 (a local law, dealing specifically with the
Orangeburg County Court) provides: "The court shall also have concurrent jurisdiction
with the court of common pleas to hear and determine actions for divorce. . . and of all
matters determinable in such actions, such as custody of children .... "
32. S.C. ConE ANN. § 14-21-1020 (1976) provides: "The [family] court shall have all
the power and authority and jurisdiction by law vested in the circuit courts of the State
in actions: . . . (4) For custody of children .... "
33. See, e.g., Snead v. Davis, 265 Ala. 229, 90 So. 2d 825 (1956); State v. Rogers, 86
So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1956); Williams v. Woolfolk, 188 Va. 312, 49 S.E.2d 270 (1948). See
generally H. CLARK, supra note 3, at § 17.3; Annot., 146 A.L.R. 1153 (1943).
34. Gardner v. Gardner, 253 S.C. 296, 170 S.E.2d 372 (1969); Piana v. Piana, 239 S.C.
367, 123 S.E.2d 297 (1961). See Clinkscales v. Clinkscales, 243 S.C. 377, 134 S.E.2d 216
(1963). See also note 1 supra.
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ings are involved.35
The facts in Heckle are similar to those of cases in South
Carolina and other jurisdictions which have held that the court
taking initial jurisdiction over a custody case maintains that ju-
risdiction. The fact that the county court originally resolved the
case by accepting the parties' own voluntary agreement should
not affect this argument, for the South Carolina Supreme Court
itself said that the initial custody decision constituted an
adjudication by the county court of what was in the best interest
of the child. Had the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the
family court on the grounds that its jurisdiction was precluded by
the county court's prior action, a decision for which they had
substantial precedent, the court might have been able to avoid
the less clear-cut issue of whether there was in fact a change in
circumstances as to warrant a change in custody 6 (the primary
issue on which Associate Justice Littlejohn dissented).
Although the court found it "unnecessary to determine
whether the family court had jurisdiction of the issue of cus-
tody,"I' it further said it could find no reason why the jurisdiction
of the issue of custody, assumed by the county court, should not
be continued. It appears, therefore, that the court, by endorsing
continued jurisdiction by the county court, actually did deter-
mine that the family court should not have taken jurisdiction
over the case. Had the court directly decided this point it might
have avoided consideration of the merits of the claim of change
in circumstances and more strongly reinforced the existing state
rule against changing jurisdiction in custody cases.
I. DIVORCE PROCEDURES
A. Alimony
The amount of an award for alimony, 9 child support,"' and
35. See, e.g., Hanson v. Stegall, 208 Ga. 403, 67 S.E.2d 109 (1951); Weddington Nr.
Weddington, 243 N.C. 702, 92 S.E.2d 71 (1956).
36. Such a procedure was followed under somewhat different factual circumstances
in Williams v. Woolfolk, 188 Va. 312, 49 S.E.2d 270 (1948). Custody had been fixed by
the Corporation Court of Alexandria and was later challenged in the Circuit Court of
Fredericksburg. By holding that the circuit court was without jurisdiction to change the
custody fixed by the initial court decision, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia did
not need to determine whether or not there was support for the circuit court's decision
changing custody.
37. 266 S.C. at 358, 223 S.E.2d at 591.
38. Id. at 359, 223 S.E.2d at 592.
39. Long v. Long, 247 S.C. 250, 252, 146 S.E.2d 873, 875 (1966).
[Vol. 29
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attorney's fees4' is generally recognized in South Carolina to be a
matter left to the discretion of the trial court. The trial court's
decision on these matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless
an abuse of discretion is shown.42 This rule appears well settled
and is based on the equitable nature of divorce proceedings 3 and
the subjective nature of the trial court's determination of the
needs and resources of the parties.44
In Mays v. Mays,4" the South Carolina Supreme Court con-
sidered both the wife's needs and the husband's ability to pay in
holding that the trial court's awards of alimony and child support
payments and attorney's fees to the wife were too low and consti-
tuted an abuse of discretion."
In January 1975, Shirley E. Mays filed an action for divorce,
a vinculo matrimonii, from Robert C. Mays, III, on the ground of
physical cruelty.47 The defendant answered the complaint, deny-
ing the plaintiff's accusations, and filed a counterclaim for di-
vorce, alleging that the plaintiff was guilty of adultery.4 8 Both
parents sought custody of the couple's infant son.49
The formal hearing on the merits of the case in the Family
Court for Kershaw County took three days; testimony and argu-
ments filled fifty-three tapes and resulted in a trial record nearly
five hundred pages long. The trial court issued its order in Octo-
ber 1975, finding that the plaintiff "has made out a prima facie
case of physical cruelty against the defendant and as such would
40. Fender v. Fender, 256 S.C. 399, 406, 182 S.E.2d 755, 758 (1971).
41. Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 193, 209 S.E.2d 42, 46 (1974). For a case dealing
with this issue in connection with all three types of payments, see Adams v. Adams, 262
S.C. 85, 202 S.E.2d 639 (1974); for cases dealing with this issue in connection with alimony
and child support, see Smith v. Smith, 264 S.C. 624, 216 S.E.2d 541 (1975); Graham v.
Graham, 253 S.C. 486, 171 S.E.2d 704 (1970).
42. Long v. Long, 247 S.C. at 252, 146 S.E.2d at 875; Graham v. Graham, 253 S.C.
at 491, 171 S.E.2d at 707; Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. at 193, 209 S.E.2d at 46.
43. Long v. Long, 247 S.C. at 251, 146 S.E.2d at 874 (citing Dobson v. Atkinson, 232
S.C. 12, 100 S.E.2d 649 (1957)).
44. Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. at 193, 209 S.E.2d at 46-47. See Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d
537 (1965): "The courts have often stressed that in determining the amount of a combined
alimony and support award, major consideration should be given to both needs and
abilities, especially the wife's and child's need for support and the husband's ability to
pay." Id. at 546-47. See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 123, 146 (1965).
45. 267 S.C. 490, 229 S.E.2d 725 (1976).
46. Id. at 495, 229 S.E.2d at 727-28.
47. Record at 1.
48. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-10 (1976) provides that adultery is a ground upon which
divorce can be granted.
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be entitled to a decree of divorce a vinculo matrimonii." The
trial judge awarded Mrs. Mays a divorce and custody of their
child. Defendant was ordered to pay $50 per week, plus the medi-
cal expenses of the child in excess of $15 per month, as child
support. The defendant was also ordered to carry hospitalization
insurance on the child.' The court further ordered the defendant
to pay, as alimony, the monthly payments on both mortgages on
the family's residence and the monthly payments on their car.
52
Should the house be sold, alimony payments were set at $225 per
month. Alimony payments were ordered to continue until a court
ordered otherwise or until such time as the plaintiff remarried.
Defendant was also ordered to pay the plaintiff's attorney $500
in attorney's fees for handling the suit. 3
Both parties appealed the trial court's order. Plaintiff chal-
lenged the court's award of alimony, child support and attorney's
fees as inadequate and said the court erred in not granting the
plaintiff a restraining order or injunction. 4 Defendant appealed
the court's granting the plaintiff a divorce, alimony, custody and
attorney's fees. 5
The supreme court considered the defendant's exceptions of
divorce, alimony, custody and attorney's fees to be "manifestly
without merit"5 6 and dismissed them under Supreme Court Rule
23 .57
Reviewing the plaintiffs exceptions, the supreme court said
the trial court's award of alimony and child support was "grossly
inadequate support from a husband whose annual income is ap-
proximately Forty Thousand ($40,000.00) Dollars."" Such an
award, the court said, will not support the wife and child "in a
manner and style to which they have been accustomed." 9 No
50. Id. at 489.
51. Id. at 490.
52. Id. at 491.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 494.
55. Id. at 492-94. The defendant also challenged the trial court's exclusion of a tape
recording of a telephone conversation which he had sought to use to impeach a witness
for plaintiff. The supreme court agreed that the trial court was wrong to exclude the
evidence, but held it "was not sufficiently prejudicial to the husband's case to afford him
any relief." 267 S.C. at 494, 229 S.E.2d at 726-27.
56. 267 S.C. at 493, 229 S.E.2d at 726.
57. S.C. SuP. CT. R. 23 (as revised effective May 13, 1976).
58. 267 S.C. at 495, 229 S.E.2d at 727.
59. Id. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 202 Va. 268, 117 S.E.2d 59 (1960): "[flt is the legal
and moral duty of a husband to support his wife and family consistent with his financial
[Vol. 29
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consideration was made, the court said, for the needs of the
mother who had custody of the couple's child as well as children
from a previous marriage,"° nor was the alimony awarded in line
with the husband's ability to pay. 1
The court further found that the award of five hundred
($500.00) dollars in attorney's fees to be "patently inequitable"
considering the "voluminous record of the case. '6 2 The court
based this view on a consideration of the "nature, extent, diffi-
culty of the case, time devoted, professional standing of counsel,
and beneficial results obtained by him. '6 3
Before an abuse of discretion is shown, the supreme court
said in Darden v. Witham,6 "there must [be] a showing by
appellant that the conclusions reached [by the lower court] were
without reasonable factual support, resulted in prejudice to the
right of the appellant, and therefore, in the circumstances,
amounted to an error of law. 6 5 While not citing this standard as
a basis for finding such an abuse, the Mays court concluded that
the alimony-child support payments and the attorney's fees
awarded to the plaintiff were so low in respect to the wife's needs
and husband's ability to pay as to constitute an abuse of discre-
tion by the lower court.6
B. Procedure
In Taylor v. Taylor67 the South Carolina Supreme Court dis-
tinguished divorce proceedings from other actions arising under
contract 6 8 and held that divorce actions are not within the
ability, according to the station in life to which he has accustomed them to live." Id. at
271, 117 S.E.2d at 62. See generally Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 537, 551-52 (1965).
60. 267 S.C. at 495, 229 S.E.2d at 727.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. (citing Darden v. Witham, 263 S.C. 183, 209 S.E.2d 42 (1974)). In Darden,
the trial judge had relied on expert testimony by five attorneys to determine proper
attorney's fees in a divorce and property settlement involving more than $1,500,000. The
supreme court said the trial judge "properly concluded that no one of the above factors
[cited in text] . . . was controlling but that consideration should be given to all in
arriving at a reasonable fee." 263 S.C. at 194, 209 S.E.2d at 46.
64. 263 S.C. 183, 209 S.E.2d 42 (1974).
65. Id. at 195, 209 S.E.2d at 47 (citing South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Sharpe, 242 S.C. 397, 131 S.E.2d 257 (1963)). Cf. Johnston v. Belk-McKnight Co. of
Newberry, S.C., Inc., 194 S.C. 490, 10 S.E.2d 1 (1940) (dealing with a change of venue);
Dobson v. Atkinson, 232 S.C. 12, 100 S.E.2d 531 (1957) (dealing with a change of custody).
66. 267 S.C. at 495, 229 S.E.2d at 727.
67. 267 S.C. 530, 229 S.E.2d 852 (1976).
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"legislative purview" 9 of actions arising on contract pursuant to
section 15-15-30(2) of the South Carolina Code. 0 Since divorces
are not governed by that section, the court held, counterclaims
may be interposed on facts maturing after the filing of the original
complaint if they existed prior to the filing of the counterclaim."
Elizabeth K. Taylor filed a complaint for divorce from Jona-
than Taylor on October 31, 1975, on the ground of physical cru-
elty," the most recent act of physical abuse alleged to have oc-
curred just ten days prior to the filing of the complaint.73 Plaintiff
sought a divorce, custody of the couple's two children, child sup-
port, attorney's fees and a property settlement as set forth in her
complaint.
7 1
After being granted an extension by the court,'75 defendant
served his answer and counterclaim on January 16, 1976, denying
plaintiff's allegations of physical cruelty and seeking a divorce on
the ground of adultery." Defendant alleged seven specific acts of
adultery by the plaintiff, five of which he claimed occurred after
plaintiffs complaint was filed.77 Defendant sought custody of the
riage contracts and other types of contracts. In Brown v. Brown, 215 S.C. 502, 56 S.E.2d
330 (1949) (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888)), the court said:
"Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released
upon the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed,
the law steps in and holds the parties to various obligations and liabilities. It is
an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply
interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society . .. .
215 S.C. at 508, 56 S.E.2d at 333. See Holliday v. Holliday, 235 S.C. 246, 254, 111 S.E.2d
205, 210 (1959); In re De Pass, 231 S.C. 134, 137-38, 97 S.E.2d 505, 507 (1957).
69. 267 S.C. at 533, 229 S.E.2d at 853.
70. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-15-30 (1976) reads as follows:
Counterclaims which may be pleaded.-
The counterclaim mentioned in § 15-13-420 must be one existing in favor of a
defendant and against a plaintiff between whom a several judgment might be
had in the action and arising out of one of the following causes of action:
(1) A cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in
the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim or connected with the
subject of the action; or
(2) In an action arising on contract, any other cause of action arising also
on contract and existing at the commencement of the action.
71. 267 S.C. at 534, 229 S.E.2d at 853-54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-420 (1976) provides
in part: "The answer of the defendant must contain: . . . (2) A statement of any new
matter constituting a defense or counterclaim in ordinary and concise language without
unnecessary repetition."
72. 267 S.C. at 532, 229 S.E.2d at 853.
73. Record at 3A.
74. Id. at 5A-6A.
75. Id. at 27.
76, Id. at 7A-11A.
77. Id. at 8A-9A.
10
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children and costs and asked that plaintiff be barred "of any
claim for alimony, support and other interest that she might as-
sert.""8 Plaintiff-appellant filed a reply February 6, 1976, the day
of the hearing in the Civil and Family Court of Laurens County,
denying defendant-respondent's allegations and asking that his
answer be dismissed.
79
Testimony was introduced at the hearing, over plaintiff's
objection, as to incidents of adultery on the part of the plaintiff
alleged to have occurred after the filing of the initial complaint.'"
The court's order, issued eleven days later, granted the defendant
a divorce on the ground of adultery, finding that the plaintiff had
been shown to have committed adultery on several occasions,
including five specific dates after the institution of plaintiffs
initial complaint.8'
Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, asserting error in the
trial court's admission of testimony on her alleged acts of adultery
after service of the complaint. 2 Respondent was limited, she
argued, to testimony with respect to adultery under the facts as
they existed at the time of the beginning of the action.8 3 To sup-
port her position, appellant relied on McAteer v. McAteer."
In McAteer, the husband as plaintiff alleged one act of adul-
tery by the wife prior to his filing of the complaint.85 At trial,
testimony was also admitted relative to other alleged acts of adul-
tery, some of which had purportedly occurred after service of the
original complaint. 6 The wife had been found guilty of the charge
of adultery, the supreme court said upon review of the lower
court's decision, on testimony concerning incidents of which she
had no notice before trial.87 In reversing the trial court's decision,
the McAteer court said, and appellant in Taylor cited in her brief:
78. Id. at 11A. S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-130 (1976) provides in part: "Award of ali-
mony and other allowances.-. . . .. But no alimony shall be granted to an adulterous
wife."
79. Record at 11A-12A.
80. Id. at 37-41. Objection was first raised by plaintiff's attorney when defendant's
attorney asked a witness about an incident on November 7, 1975.
81. Id. at 12A-20A. Each parent was awarded custody of one of the two children with
reasonable visitation rights in the other. Appellant was "forever barred from any claim to
alimony or support from the defendant." Id. at 20A.
82. Brief for Appellant at 2.
83. Id. at 3.
84. 262 S.C. 475, 205 S.E.2d 377 (1974).
85. Id. at 477, 205 S.E.2d at 379.
86. Id. at 478-79, 205 S.E.2d at 379.
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"The amendment allowed during trial, at least as it related to
acts of adultery alleged to have occurred after the service of the
complaint, constituted new matter which could be taken advan-
tage of, as a grounds for divorce in this action, only by supple-
mental pleading.""8
The McAteer court relied heavily, respondent argued, on the
fact that the new material was introduced for the first time at the
trial itself8 9 and the wife was "not afforded reasonable opportun-
ity to meet" those grounds. 0 Appellant cited other cases holding
that only matters existing at the commencement of the action
will be allowed9' and that new matters arising after commence-
ment of an action should be introduced by supplemental plead-
ing.2 As respondent pointed out in his brief, however, these were
not divorce cases. 3 Commenting on the appropriateness of using
a supplemental pleading, respondent contended that since the
answer and counterclaim, containing the allegations of adultery,
were filed in time to give appellant a reasonable opportunity to
prepare her defense, 4 the rule requiring new material to be raised
in the supplemental pleading" was inapplicable.
The Taylor court defined the issue to be whether a counter-
claim for divorce "can be based on facts occurring subsequent to
the commencement of the initial action."" Under section 15-15-
30 of the South Carolina Code" counterclaims under contracts
must exist at the time the initial action is commenced. In support
of its holding that a divorce proceeding is not an action arising
on a contract, and that facts occurring after the complaint is filed
may be established by counterclaim, the court cited a North Car-
olina case, Cameron v. Cameron.
9
The wife in Cameron had brought the initial action for di-
vorce.9 While this action was pending, the husband had brought
88. Id. at 480, 205 S.E.2d at 379; Brief for Appellant at 5.
89. Brief for Respondent at 4.
90. Id.; 262 S.C. at 480, 205 S.E.2d at 379.
91. American Agricultural Chem. Co. v. Thomas, 206 S.C. 355, 34 S.E.2d 592 (1945);
Ferguson Lumber Co. v. Elliott, 171 S.C. 455, 172 S.E. 616 (1934).
92. Francis Marion Hotel v. Chicco, 131 S.C. 344, 127 S.E. 436 (1925).
93. Brief for Respondent at 3.
94. Id. at 4-5.
95. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-100 (1976).
96. 267 S.C. at 533, 229 S.E.2d at 853. For a general discussion of this issue, see
Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 1264 (1964).
97. See note 70 supra.
98. 235 N.C. 82, 68 S.E.2d 796 (1952).
99. Id. at 84, 68 S.E.2d at 797.
[Vol. 29
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his own action for divorce."' When the second action was heard
by the trial court, Mrs. Cameron raised the pendency of her ac-
tion in abatement."" After the trial court refused to dismiss the
action, Mrs. Cameron appealed to the Supreme Court of North
Carolina.'10
The North Carolina court considered whether the husband in
light of the facts could obtain the relief he sought in the subse-
quent action by counterclaim in the prior action'13 and concluded
that he could.""1 The court continued:
Such counterclaim or cross demand may even be based, in
whole or in part, upon facts occurring after the institution of the
action. This is true because the statute'0 5 does not require that
a counterclaim must be one existing at the commencement of
the plaintiffs action except in the case of a counterclaim arising
out of contract.106
By holding that divorce proceedings are not proceedings on
a contract for purposes of section 15-15-30 and thereby allowing
the defendant's counterclaim for adultery, the Taylor court did
not reach the issue argued by the appellant on the purpose of a
supplemental pleading under section 15-13-100107 and the
McAteer case.'08 Had the defendant been required to file an im-
mediate answer and counterclaim and then subsequently sought
to introduce evidence of later alleged acts of adultery, the circum-
stances would have been similar to those of McAteer in that a
supplemental pleading would likely have been required.
The major importance of the Taylor decision is its clear
statement that facts arising after a complaint is filed may be
alleged in a counterclaim for divorce. The exact procedure which
should be used to submit these facts, and whether a supplemental
100. Id.
101. Id. at 84, 68 S.E.2d at 798.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 86, 68 S.E.2d at 799.
104. Id. (citing Lockhart v. Lockhart, 223 N.C. 559, 27 S.E.2d 444 (1943); Shore v.
Shore, 220 N.C. 802, 18 S.E.2d 353 (1942); Ellis v. Ellis, 190 N.C. 418, 130 S.E. 7 (1925).
105. In relying on Cameron, the Taylor court described the North Carolina statute
as a "duplicate" of § 15-15-30 of the S.C. Code. 267 S.C. at 534, 229 S.E.2d at 854.
106. 235 N.C. at 86, 68 S.E.2d at 799 (citations omitted). See H. CLARK, LAW OF
DoMEsTIc RELATIONS § 13.3, at 387 (1968); 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 323
(1966).
107. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-13-100 (1976).
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pleading is required, will depend on the timing and specific fac-
tors of each case in light of the Taylor and McAteer decisions.
III. ADOPTION
A final decree of adoption in South Carolina relieves natural
parents of all rights over and responsibilities for the adopted
child,"" whether the adoption was with their consent or by judi-
cial decree."" Where adoption is by written parental consent"'
and that consent was obtained by fraud, South Carolina allows
the final decree of adoption to be set aside."
2
In Silas v. Brown,"3 the South Carolina Supreme Court up-
held a 1975 lower court ruling setting aside a 1968 adoption decree
on the ground that the natural mother's consent had been ob-
tained through fraud. The Silases became the adoptive parents
of Eleanor Brown's child under a judicial decree on January 30,
1968. ' '1 Both adoptive parents died in November 1974, and the
Davises, collateral kin of the Silases, assumed custody of the
minor child. "I
In her initial action, in January 1975, Brown sought custody
of the child, believing, she later argued, that her parental rights
had not been forever barred by the original adoption order."'
After being denied custody, she brought a second action before
the same associate judge of the Charleston County Family Court
to have the 1968 adoption decree set aside."7 Brown contended
that she thought that the 1968 proceeding was a custody matter
only and that she still had parental rights in the child."I8 By order
dated June 23, 1975, the family court voided the January 30,
109. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-130 (1976) states in part that upon entry of a final decree
of adoption the natural parents "shall be relieved of all parental responsibilities for the
child and have no rights over such adopted child."
110. For a discussion of the two circumstances under which parental consent is not
required for adoption, see Domestic Relations, 1975 Survey of S.C. Low, 28 S.C.L. REV.
308, 321 (1975).
111. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-45-70 (1976) sets forth the requirements of the written
parental consent after which an adoption of a child may be decreed.
112. Lowe v. Clayton, 264 S.C. 75, 84, 212 S.E.2d 582, 586 (1975); Wold v. Funder-
burg, 250 S.C. 205, 210, 157 S.E.2d 180, 182 (1967).
113. 266 S.C. 505, 224 S.E.2d 672 (1976).
114. Id. at 506, 224 S.E.2d at 672.
115. Id.
116. Record at 2. Brown raised the argument on her parental rights in her second
petition. Record at 11.
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1968, adoption decree and restored all parental rights in Brown. "'
The Davises appealed to the supreme court on the exception
that the first dispute settled the custody question and, therefore,
introduction of testimony on the same issue was barred in the
second action by the doctrine of res judicata or estoppel.'2 " The
court dismissed the appeal under rule 4, section 6 of the Rules of
the South Carolina Supreme Court' 2' on the ground that the ex-
ception was too general to be considered.' 22 Nevertheless, the
court proceeded to evaluate the merits of the exception and deter-
mined that the frequency of plaintiff's visitation with the child,
the issue around which the exception focused, was not the basis
of the initial custody decision. Therefore, relying on Lowe v.
Clayton, 23 the court said consideration of the visitation issue was
not precluded in the second action to have the adoption decree
set aside on the basis of fraud.'
2
The fact that seven years had passed between the initial
adoption decree and the suit to set that decree aside on the basis
of fraud was not specifically raised as an issue on appeal nor taken
into account by the supreme court. It is generally recognized that
consent of a natural parent to adoption can be revoked on the
grounds that it was obtained by fraud.' 21 However, the fact that
in Silas seven years elapsed between the time of the natural
mother's alleged consent and her contention that the consent was
obtained through fraud would make the application of such a rule
more difficult.'
2 6
119. Id. at 18-19.
120. 266 S.C. at 507, 224 S.E.2d at 673.
121. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 4, § 6 (1976) requires that each exception set out for review
"contain a concise statement of one proposition of law or fact" and further that each
exception "contain within itself a complete assignment of error ....
122. 266 S.C. at 507, 224 S.E.2d at 673.
123. 264 S.C. 75, 212 S.E.2d 582 (1975). One year earlier, in Lowe v. Clayton, the
court discussed the applicability of estoppel and res judicata to adoption cases. The court
there held that an order denying visitation rights to the natural mother did not bar her
from seeking to have the adoption decree set aside on the basis of fraud.
124. While not relying on this argument for its decision to dismiss the appeal, the
court endorsed the respondent's argument that frequency of visitation was not the basis
for the court's decision in the 1975 custody hearing, while it was relevant in the action
based on fraud. See Brief for Respondent at 5.
125. H. CLARK, LAW OF DoMEsTIc RELATIONS § 18.10 (1968); Annot., 2 A.L.R.2d 887,
897 (1948). See also Annot., 74 A.L.R.3d 489 (1976).
126. See H. CLARK, supra note 125, at § 18.10: Many states have enacted statutes
which provide that adoptions may not be set aside after the running of a short period of
limitations, usually five years. See also Note, In the Child's Best Interests: Rights of the
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One argument in Brown's favor would have been that the
question of what would happen to the child on the Silases' death,
the focus of her fraud-in-consent argument, did not arise until
their death in November 1974. Thus, she could have argued that
her effort to have the adoption set aside on the basis of fraud-in-
consent came within a few months of her becoming aware of the
exact nature of the 1968 decision. The supreme court was able to
avoid deciding the merits of such an argument by holding that
the issue raised on appeal failed to comply with the court's rules
on specificity.
While there may be support in Silas for allowing fraud-in-
consent to be argued to set aside an adoption decree after a
lengthy time lapse, it is by no means clear from the opinion that
such an argument would succeed under different factual circum-
stances since this issue was not discussed in the opinion. The
Silas opinion does suggest a need for a possible revision of the
state's statutes to incorporate a time limit on raising the fraud-
in-consent argument,' 21 particularly because of the need for final-
ity in adoption proceedings to protect the welfare of the children
involved. At the very least, the Silas ruling should be restricted
to allow a party to raise fraud-in-consent only if he or she is able
to demonstrate that the party gained actual understanding of the
terms of the initial adoption decree only shortly before bringing
the action to have the decree set aside.
IV. SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
In South Carolina the courts recognize the general rule that
settlements and agreements between litigants in divorce proceed-
ings should be given deference in determining a final settlement.
In Reece v. Reece,' the South Carolina Supreme Court applied
this rule to deny an appellant-wife's claim for alimony on the
ground that the parties' own settlement agreement covered all
financial claims.' 21 Plaintiff filed for divorce in the Court of Com-
Revocation of Parental Consent in Adoption Proceedings: Recent Developments, 8 COLUM.
J. OF L. AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 156, 166 (1972). The weight of authority suggests that an
argument based on a theory such as laches in a case like Silas might be successful. But
see Annot., 83 A.L.R.2d 945, 952 (1962).
127. For a discussion of such statutes adopted elsewhere, see Note, 51 N.Y.U.L. REv.,
supra note 126, at 453.
128. 266 S.C. 316, 223 S.E.2d 182 (1976).
129. Id. at 320, 223 S.E.2d at 183 (quoting Darden v. Witham, 258 S.C. 380, 388, 188
S.E.2d 776, 779 (1972): "The courts favor settlements and agreements amongst litigants,
[Vol. 29
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mon Pleas of Greenville County seeking alimony, custody, child
support, and attorney's fees. Plaintiff also asked to be named an
equal partner in her husband's financial holdings.'" Reference
was held before a master in equity where a proposed negotiated
settlement was presented and agreed to by both parties.''13 Before
the agreement was read into the record, the master stated:
Let the record show that extensive negotiation has taken place
between the parties through their respective attorneys as bears
upon a calm and serious and genuine effort to resolve the prop-
erty ownership and right and any support and/or alimony as
encompassed within the issues as raised by the pleadings as
amended.'32
Plaintiff filed exceptions to the master's report, claiming
that the agreement was not a full and final settlement. 33 The trial
court denied plaintiff's exceptions and adopted the master's re-
port. "It is abundantly clear," the trial court said, "that a bona
fide agreement was reached between the plaintiff and the defen-
dant regarding alimony, property settlement and all claims grow-
ing out of the marital relationship ....
Plaintiff appealed to the supreme court, citing the recognized
distinction between alimony payments and property settle:
ments.' 35 She contended that the agreement was only a property
settlement and, therefore, that she was still entitled to alimony,
and regard as commendable efforts by the parties to settle their differences without the
courts' intervention or assistance.").
130. Record at 10-11.
131. Id. at 24-25. The stipulations and agreements, as read into the record before the
master by the appellant's attorney, provided that the defendant would convey the home
of the parties to the plaintiff as a part of a lump-sum settlement; furthermore, additional
monthly payments of a lump-sum amount were to be paid over a twenty year period with
interest. Also the defendant was to pay part of the plaintiff's attorney's fees; and, lastly a
provision was made for one-half of the monthly payments to be put in trust for the children
of the parties if the plaintiff were to remarry. Id.
132. Id. at 24. Both the trial court and the supreme court emphasized this comment
by the master in holding the agreement settled all claims between the parties. 266 S.C.
at 319, 223 S.E.2d at 183; Record at 35.
133. Record at 32.
134. Id. at 36.
135. Brief for Appellant at 9-13. Appellant relied heavily on 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce
and Separation § 883 (1966); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 202 (1959); and Darden v. Witham,
258 S.C. 380, 188 S.E.2d 776 (1972). The court in Darden recognized: "It is sometimes
difficult to distinguish between alimony in gross and a property settlement. The lower
court preferred to consider Darden's payments as alimony in gross or lump sum alimony.
We are inclined to think of them as payments made under a property settlement." Id. at
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child support, and attorney's fees.' 31 The supreme court relied
primarily on the master's statement' 3 and the parties' responses
to the master's questions'38 to hold that the agreement "was in-
tended to include all financial claims growing out of the marital
relationship including alimony.'
39
While the appellant correctly cited the Darden case as recog-
nizing a distinction between alimony and property settlements,
the court in Darden had further held that where the parties agree
to a lump sum property settlement, that settlement is generally
not modifiable if no power is reserved by the court to amend.",
In Reece, no power was reserved in the court to amend the agree-
ment."' Since the agreement purported to cover all aspects of the
couple's settlement, including alimony and property, and was a
lump sum arrangement, Darden would have been authority for
denying any request for modification of the property provisions'
and probably the alimony provisions'13 as well, had plaintiff
sought to modify rather than to establish that the agreement was
incomplete. The court in Reece did not find it necessary to reach
the modification issue,' however, relying on the plaintiffs own
136. Brief for Appellant at 13-16.
137. See text accompanying note 132 supra.
138. The following discussion, quoted by the court, took place between the master
and the parties after the agreement (note 131 supra) was read into the record:
By the Master: And, the Court at this time would inquire of Mr. Reece as to
his full understanding of what has been stated and to his agreement to all that
has been received into the record.
Do you so understand and agree thereto?
By Mr. Reece: Yes sir.
By the Master: In similar fashion, the Court does inquire of the plaintiff, Mrs.
Elizabeth L. Reece, as to your understanding and agreement as to what has been
received into the record.
Do you so understand and agree thereto?
By Mrs. Elizabeth L. Reece: Yes, sir.
Record at 26-27.
139. 266 S.C. at 320, 223 S.E.2d at 183.
140. Darden v. Witham, 258 S.C. at 388, 188 S.E.2d at 778 (citing 2A W. NELSON,
DIVORCE AND ANNULMENT § 17.03 (2d ed. 1961); 24 AM. JUR. 2d Divorce and Separation 99
670, 909 (1966); 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 238d (1959)).
141. The terms of the agreement, as stipulated by the parties, are set out in note 131
supra. As adopted by the trial court, the terms are set out in the trial record at 39-40.
142. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
143. See Darden v. Witham, "[Ilf the divorce court awards alimony in gross, or in
a lump sum, without reserving the power to amend, the court cannot modify the provision,
even where it is payable in installments." 258 S.C. at 387, 188 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting 24
AM. JuR. 2d Divorce and Separation § 668 (1966); Blakely v. Blakely, 249 S.C. 623, 155
S.E.2d 857 (1967)).
144. A court's power to modify alimony payments is set out in S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-
18
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participation in the master's hearing and the agreement made
at that hearing to hold that the initial arrangement had settled
all claims.
Ralph D. Karpinos
3-170 (1976). For a general discussion of a court's ability to modify a settlement based on
the parties' agreement, see Annot., 61 A.L.R.3d 520 (1975).
19
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